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DEVISING PROCEDURES THAT ARE CIVIL TO 
PROMOTE JUSTICE THAT IS CIVILIZEDt 
Maurice Rosenberg* 
!. INTRODUCTION 
DISCUSSING procedure and process in this era is not likely to set our blood to pounding. It seems a thin gruel to serve in times 
like these when we have so many meat-and-potatoes evils to worry 
about-so many flaming substantive issues to quench: air we can see 
but not breathe; water we can smell but not drink; cities crumbling; 
students rumbling; crime raging; wars waging; drug abuse expand-
ing; and brotherhood contracting. 
Yet, in my book, procedure is important. Hastily, may I say that 
I am not by that comment inserting a sly plug for the casebook that 
Arthur Miller foregoes using in his Civil Procedure course at 
Michigan, or that Ben Kaplan eschews in his Civil Procedure offer-
ing at Harvard.1 
In a democracy, process is king to a very large extent, and this is 
especially so in the judicial branch. Even though substantive laws 
command attention, procedural rules ensure respect. Why is this 
true? One powerful reason is that when people end up in court, their 
case typically is not a matter of right against wrong, but of right 
against right. Decent process makes the painful task of deciding 
which party will prevail bearable and helps make the decision itself 
acceptable. 
To put my position plainly, I believe that the road to court-made 
justice is paved with good procedures. Later on we shall have a look 
at what I mean by "good." For now, it is enough to note that proce-
dures cannot be "good" or "bad" in isolation, without relation to 
their context. They must be viewed as part of an enlightened system 
of judicial administration, criminal and noncriminal. They must fit 
into a whole. The law may in some sense be a seamless web, but in 
the administration of justice separations are necessary and must be 
t This Article and the following two were originally presented as the Twentieth 
Series of the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan Law School, 
November 17, 18, and 19, 1970.-Ed. 
• Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1940, Syracuse University; LL.B. 
1947, Columbia University.-Ed. 
1. M. RosENBERG, J. 'WEINSTEIN &: H. SMIT, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 
1970). But cf. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL&: A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES&: MATE· 
RIALS (1968), and R. FIELD &: B. KAPLAN, l\fATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE (temp. 2d ed. 1968). 
No plug, indeed!-Ed. 
[797] 
798 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:797 
recognized. Some lines must demarcate the spheres of courts and 
some must demarcate the spheres of other agencies of justice, such 
as legislatures, official boards, or even private entities. One of today's 
problems is that the seams are not showing clearly enough. To devise 
better court procedures, we must at some point determine what spe-
cial role courts-in contrast to other agencies-can most usefully 
play in delivering justice to the people. This definitional process will 
help us know which quarrels and conflicts courts ought to counte-
nance and which they should leave to other social instrumentalities. 
II. PROMOTING QUALITY JUSTICE-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Procedural rules have to be seen not only as performing their 
particular functions, but also in the context of the judicial process as 
a whole. In the round, they are one unit in the system designed to 
promote quality justice through that process-an element in 
the science of judicial administration. When we examine the state 
of judicial administration in this country, we encounter the paradox 
that the science is alive and well but the patient is failing. "Crisis" 
is the word most commonly used to describe the status of our judicial 
system. 
Nonetheless, foreign judges and scholars throng here to study 
our methods of judicial administration. Some might think these pil-
grimages akin to visiting a morgue to learn health habits. But in my 
opinion the visitors are right to make them. In this nation we have 
invested more energy, attention, concern, and resources than has any 
other place on earth in an effort to upgrade judicial administration. 
That the investment has left us far short of perfection is an obvious 
understatement and a fact that is no secret abroad. Then why do our 
friends keep visiting? 
My speculation is that the jurists who come here from France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, and other nations, west and east, appreciate 
our realism and devotion more than our achievements. While their 
court problems differ in kind, their interest runs parallel to ours. 
Like us, they need new information and methods to improve their 
courts and are prepared to go outside the traditional domain of 
lawyerly knowledge for help, as we are doing here. 
Last May a contingent of Italian jurists made an extended visit 
to judicial-administration centers in this country, equipped with a 
comprehensive "Program of Study and Research" and with introduc-
tions arranged by our State Department. Their agenda dis-
closed a wide range of up-to-date interests. The visiting judges 
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wanted to know what our specialists in court systems could tell them 
about a sophisticated list of judicial-administration items. They 
wanted to learn all they could about the adaptability of management-
science principles to courts; about cost-benefit analysis; about ad-
vanced data collection techniques, including the effective uses of 
interviews and questionnaires; and about new types of hardware for 
storing and processing data. They asked about new methods of mak-
ing systematic studies of procedural rules in operation and about 
many other sophisticated developments in judicial administration, 
management, and evaluation. 
The Italians' questions contrast interestingly with the program 
proposed in July by an American Bar Association Task Force on 
Standards of Judicial Administration (Task Force).2 After canvassing 
several principles it regarded as accepted and correct, and after tick-
ing off some notable failings in the administration of justice in fed-
eral and state courts, the Task Force reported: 
The greatest need and opportunity for fresh effort in judicial 
administration concerns the quality of justice itself. Standards and 
techniques concerning court organization, procedure and manage-
ment are not enough, for they do not deal directly with the quality 
of justice as it reaches each individual citizen who becomes in-
volved with the courts as a litigant, complainant, witness, juror or 
public observer. In our opinion a major effort is required to im-
prove the quality of the administration of justice and to establish 
standards to advance this goal.3 
It is clear enough that the Task Force effort is designed to go beyond 
organization, procedure, and management for courts. How far beyond 
ought it go, and into what areas? 
The reference to "quality of justice as it reaches each individual 
citizen" is not to be thought of as a call for standards that will assure 
perfect, neverfail, hand-crafted justice in each and every case. The 
Lorelei and Sirens are waiting to ·wreck the ships of reformers who set 
their courses by the loveliest stars instead of by those that will bring 
them to port. We shall be self-defeatingly quixotic if we try to devise 
a system of Rolls Royce judicial treatment to deliver perfect justice 
in each of millions upon millions of cases. We need the highest 
quality we can possibly achieve in our system, our procedures, our 
management methods and personnel, and in the judges who preside 
in our courts. This focus on the apparatus of justice is not indicative 
of lack of solicitude for each litigant as a singular and worthy person 
2. ABA TASK FORCE ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, REPORT (1970). 
5. Id. at!!. 
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entitled to our deepest concern. On the contrary, it is concern for 
the individual that compels a view of the conditions of justice in 
breadth and depth. 
We must never forget that it is a mass-phenomenon problem we 
are at grips with-one immensely complex and stubborn. Part of the 
reason we have had so much difficulty in gaining ground on it is our 
eagerness to find once-for-all, perfect, and plain solutions. But 
solutions that seem obvious also seem not to work. For example, 
why not just add more judges? The answer, sad to say, is that cre-
ating new judgeships has not resulted in keeping the courts abreast 
of their workload. Senator Joseph D. Tydings called attention to 
this bleak truth when he pointed out that 
[b]etween 1951 and 1966 we continued to add new judges to the 
federal district courts, but the total backlog in those courts increased 
by more than 15 percent . 
. . . In recent years despite a 25 percent increase in judicial man-
power, the federal courts were able to step up the disposition of 
cases by only three percent.4 
We can be confident that the Task Force is aware of these trouble-
some facts and will not take the simplistic "add-judges" approach to 
improved standards. I hope the Task Force is also aware of other 
fool's-gold of this sort, and goes at its work with determined, im-
aginative, and persistent devotion. 
Past efforts to improve judicial administration by fell swoops and 
bold strokes have uncovered some tried and true pitfalls. One of the 
best ways to fail is to approach the problem as if the whole venture 
consisted of finding a set of vaccines for a set of judicial ailments. A 
good example of that approach is a pamphlet entitled Ten Cures for 
Court Congestion,5 a famous list of unsuccessful prescriptions con-
cocted in the 1950's. Apodictic imperatives of that kind are losers. 
They look good on the front cover of the brochures, but they do not 
work. They have to be put to one side, along with various other 
sure-cure panaceas and three-minute recipes for happy courts. 
To the same limbo must be consigned the bagful of tinkerings 
and patchings that includes split trials, interest from the day of 
injury, inducements to waive jury trials, statements of readiness or 
of super-readiness, and other gimmicks aimed especially at personal-
injury litigation. When the Titanic is sinking, there is no use in 
bailing water with thimbles. 
4. Tydings, Modernizing Our Courts, 4 GEORGIA ST. B.J. 84, 85-86 (1967). 
5. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT CoNGESTlON 
(1959). 
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The first hope is to attain some perspective on our problems: the 
glutted calendars and mobbed courtrooms; the unconscionable de-
lays, alternating with rush-rush-rush; the mistreatment of jurors 
and witnesses; the excessive expense; the tarnished image of justice 
for millions of Americans. These are chiefly ills of big-city courts-
New York and Chicago being uninspiring examples. Other coun-
tries have big cities, too-Tokyo, London, Rome. Yet they seem not 
to be afflicted as badly as we are in their efforts to deliver civilized 
justice through courts. Why? 
Comparative studies may be instructive. But the help we need 
will not, in my opinion, come in the form of importing specific rules 
or practices from the British or Italian systems. Rather, it will come 
from the opportunity the comparisons give to hold up a mirror to 
our own pluralistic system, free from the distorting effects of viewing 
the too familiar from too close up. Thus, in these lectures, my col-
leagues will draw upon their experiences as eminent comparatists to 
stimulate our capacity for self-appraisal. My focus, on the other hand, 
will be upon insights, real or imagined, gained by empirical studies 
in the "field," where one can systematically observe procedural 
rules and practices in action ap.d attempt to gauge their impact. 
In a world that is ever more oriented to empirical inquiry-fact-
happy, statistics-conscious, and science-minded-the law has joined 
the procession belatedly. Yet join it has. Now, lawmakers commonly 
hold hearings, call upon experts, study statistical tables and charts, 
and so forth, before they enact new laws. They usually look before 
they legislate. 
Less popular has been the procedure of looking after they legis-
late. Until recently, it was very rare for a legislative body to employ 
evaluation research or impact studies to find out whether the 
injection of new law had made any difference. This oversight 
is traceable to an odd conceit of the law that can be summed up in 
terms familiar to every law student. The three commandments of 
legal reform are 
(1) Identify the "evil to be remedied." 
(2) Pass a law to remedy it. 
(3) Go on to the next evil. 
Law reform has had a strong addiction to the motto of Satchel 
Paige, the baseball pitcher and sage extraordinaire, who used to 
advise: "Never look back. They might be gaining on you." That is 
fine advice for aging ballplayers, but poor practice for lawmakers. 
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Happily, the new look in law is intent on finding out how rules 
function in fact and not only in thinking about how they ought to.6 
III. PUTI'ING "QUALITY OF JUSTICE" IN Focus 
If we all agree that we want standards of quality in justice, how 
shall we go about setting them? Is "quality justice" definable, or is it 
like Justice Stewart's dictum about hard-core pornography-some-
thing I can't define, "But I know it when I see it ... "?7 
Is quality justice like beauty-relative, and existing only in the 
eyes of the beholders? If so, are the beholders all those whom we 
encompass anonymously in our minds when we proclaim that justice 
must not only be done but must be seen to be done? That would 
encompass litigants, lawyers, jurors, witnesses, spectators, and the 
larger public that becomes aware of the case and its course. To meas-
ure quality from that standpoint would require public-opinion and 
attitude surveys about the law, courts, judges, lawyers, and the whole 
judicial panoply. Surveys of that sort are interesting and instructive, 
but, given the fleeting character of what is deemed to be good and 
beautiful in the public fancy, one would not want to hitch the quality 
of justice to the passing bandwagon of popular fad. 
There must be intrinsic elements in justice of good quality. It is 
these we must identify if we can, rather than depending upon pub-
lic attitudes or opinions about the system and its parts. 
Our system does contain recognized categories and clusters of 
values that might be regarded as standards or criteria of quality 
justice. Category A is the due process cluster-the constitutional im-
peratives that have evolved as guarantors of basic decency in our 
civil-litigation process: fair notice, opportunity to be heard, and trial 
by a tribunal that is both impartial and jurisdictionally related to 
the litigants or their dispute. In addition, we might include in this 
category the Supreme Court's doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor!: 
"Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is 
essential to proper litigation."9 
Category B is made up of values that are not elements of ordered 
liberty in the due process sense, but nonetheless are basic and tradi-
tional. One basic value is that litigants shall have easy access to courts. 
Reflecting the strength of this value are several related practices: fil-
ing costs are low, legal fees are often contingent, and the loser need 
6. Rosenberg, The New Looks in Law, 52 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 539 (1969). 
7. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) Oustice Stewart, concurring). 
8. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
9. 329 U.S. at 507. 
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not reimburse the winner for his litigation expenses. Other basic 
policies are implicit in the principles favoring an opportunity for 
vigorous cross-examination of adverse witnesses and insisting that 
the first-round loser shall have a chance at review by a collegial 
court. Still another policy reflecting basic values in this category is 
the heavy stress on the desirability of deciding cases on their merits 
rather than upon procedural missteps. 
Category C encompasses the human equation: judges and lawyers 
of probity, capacity, and merit. The Task Force will surely be 
interested in these human factors in quality justice, for the Ameri-
can Bar Association has long urged selection of judges on merit and 
has recently produced a new Code of Professional Responsibility10 
that gives hope of improving the breed of lawyers in the place where 
it counts most-the realm of their professional conduct. 
Category D consists of those subtle factors or elements the pres-
ence or absence of which in various degrees might affect our confi-
dence that a fair tribunal would reach a correct decision. They are 
relevant for assessing whether some trials are "better" or "worse" 
than others; not on the score of due process or the traditional values 
(all of which are hypothesized to be present in both groups), but with 
regard to characteristics soon to be suggested. 
Category E consists of energy-conserving criteria that do not 
enter directly into the adjudication; they concern efficiency. 
Where is improvement in quality likely to be made? Quite 
clearly, the due process standards that appear in Category A are be-
yond both the Task Force's power and desire to change. Rather, a 
Standards Commission will probably affirm in the strongest terms its 
devotion to the short list of constitutional and Supreme Court com-
mands. 
As to the basic and traditional aspects of common-law litigation 
embraced in Category B, again the strong likelihood is that no one 
will urge that any be dropped or curtailed. Easy access to courts, low 
costs, cross-examination, and the other practices in group B are not, 
as I see it, in danger of extinction in the name of improving quality. 
Category C-the human equation-is a logical area in which to 
attempt to improve the quality of justice. The Task Force will un-
doubtedly look closely at the personal element in the judicial sys-
tem, since high quality judges are a sine qua non of high quality 
justice.11 In terms other than quantitative the human factors are 
IO. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILlTY AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETmcs (1970). 
11. Rosenberg, Frank Talk on Improving the Administration of Justice, 47 TEXAS 
L. REv. 1029, 1031 (1969). 
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most difficult to evaluate in isolation. Rather than analyzing them 
separately at this point,12 we can, in my opinion, gain some insights 
into these human traits by looking at the elements in Categories D 
and E-those that relate to "trial quality" and functional efficiency. 
Most of what is proposed here concerning these elements is the 
residue of my experience with the Columbia Project for Effective 
Justice (Project)13 in the eight-year period beginning with the 
Project's inception in 1956. There is no need to douse you with 
a barrelful of detailed statistics about the field studies the Pro-
ject made on the operation of procedural rules and practices. Any 
references to particulars in the comments that follow will serve only 
to raise general questions and develop a few working hypotheses. 
These hypotheses will then become the take-off point for entering 
into a discussion of how the administration of justice might be 
improved by devising better processes, broadly defined. 
In the first place, a number of these reflections on "quality of 
justice" rest upon a tiresome amount of hand-to-hand wrestling with 
the definition of that phrase in New Jersey. The wrestling was done 
in connection with an official controlled experiment to determine 
the effectiveness of compulsory pretrial conferences in negligence 
cases.14 The genesis of the experiment can be recounted briefly. 
In 1948, New Jersey, under the judicial leadership of Arthur T. 
Vanderbilt and his distinguished lieutenant William J. Brennan, Jr., 
broke new ground by making pretrial conferences mandatory in all 
civil actions.15 Their overriding purpose was, in Justice Brennan's 
words, "to further the disposition of the cases according to right and 
justice on the merits."16 
In the classic New Jersey form, the dynamics of pretrial confer-
ences are quite simple. When a case is well along the path to trial, the 
judge calls the lawyers to a private meeting at which he works with 
them to sharpen and condense the issues and mold the case in a way 
that will help improve its presentation at trial. Some judges maintain 
that the procedure is also useful in encouraging pretrial settlements, 
but for the rule makers the primary purpose was improved quality 
rather than greater efficiency. 
In 1959, the trial bar of the state had mounted a vigorous cam-
12. See text accompanying notes 37-43 infra. 
13. See M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964). 
14. See id. 
15. See Brennan, Pre-Trial Procedure in New Jersey-A Demonstration, 28 N.Y. ST. 
B. Buu.. 442 (1956). 
16. Id. at 449. 
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paign to abolish pretrial conferences in accident cases on the ground 
that they accomplished nothing and wasted time. Chief Justice Joseph 
Weintraub, Vanderbilt's successor, asked the Project to study the 
mandatory pretrial conference system in negligence cases and to 
report its :findings. Since his court had the power to make and revise 
rules, we were able to persuade it to install an official controlled 
experiment. The major objective was to learn whether the mandatory 
conference improved the quality of justice in cases subject to it. We 
also were interested to learn whether the procedure substantially re-
duced the courts' time outlay in disposing of personal-injury suits. 
To install the experiment, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
suspended the mandatory pretrial rule for a six-month period in 
seven test counties. Instead of compelling a pretrial conference in 
every case, the court required one in every second case, chosen at 
random. In scientific parlance, the former group of cases then served 
as a control group and the nonmandatory cases as an experimental 
group. 
A total of 3,000 cases went through the experimental program in 
1960. We waited two years until they had run their full courses to 
either settlement or trial and beyond. By obtaining answers to de-
tailed questionnaires from the judges, lawyers, and clerks involved 
in the cases, careful reports were amassed on important variables. 
The data were then coded, compiled, and analyzed. Three major 
sets of findings emerged, two of which can be disposed of with brief 
mention. In the first place, the mandatory pretrial conference pro-
cedure produced a loss in judge time, not a saving, so that it could 
not be justified as an efficiency-promoting device. Second, to our 
surprise, it developed that the mandatory pretrial system had the 
effect of increasing the size of the plaintiffs' recoveries. This result, 
no one had expected. Influenced by the rather dramatic evidence that 
the mandatory pretrial conference was not an efficient procedure as 
conducted by their judges-who spent about twenty per cent of their 
pretrial time on it with no saving in trial time-the New Jersey 
supreme court in 1964 made pretrial optional instead of obligatory 
in the largest class of civil cases.17 
The issue that concerns us primarily, however, is not efficiency 
but whether the mandatory procedure improved the quality of 
justice. The literature is virtually silent on how this question is to 
be answered systematically, probably because before the improve-
ment of research methodology lawyers had no occasion to think about 
17. N.J.R. Civ. PRAc. 4.29-l(a) (1969), as amended, N.J.R. CIV. PRAC. 4.25-2(a) 
(1969). 
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or attempt to state quality criteria in any serious or systematic fashion. 
Justice Cardozo did not even advert to the subject in The Nature 
of the Judicial Process.18 Intuition and speculation were thought to 
be all that one needed to discern how well the judicial system was 
functioning, if one even deemed it necessary to go outside the system's 
own quality control mechanisms of corrective motions and appeals-
the built-in procedures for correcting errors in the litigation process. 
The Project turned to these ready-made yardsticks to learn how 
well the trial results stood up under formal attack launched by a 
motion for a new trial or by appeal. We compared the control group 
with the experimental group. Without going into great detail, I must 
tell you that the effort was totally unrewarding. You can doubtless 
guess why. Of the 3,000 cases, only twenty-seven were appealed, 
twelve from the experimental group and :fifteen from the control 
group. These :figures were too skimpy for statistical dependability. 
And it would have been completely out of the question to pay serious 
attention to the comparative number of successful appeals in the two 
groups as a test of underlying quality of trial results because there 
were fewer than a handful of reversals. A similar problem of scarcity 
impaired the usefulness of the data on motions for new trials. 
Therefore, we had to abandon the system's built-in quality yard-
sticks. We set out to construct new indicia that might be more useful 
in measuring the influence of pretrial on the quality of the trials. 
We turned to a set of factors we thought woud tell us in a 
significant way whether the obligatory conference was making any 
difference by focusing on a simple question: Was it producing better 
trials?19 "Better" in the sense we used it did not refer to the 
decisions reached, but to the process. Was the contest good, fair, and 
informed? Was the case well and truly presented? 
To evaluate the trials, we asked the clerks, judges, and lawyers to 
· rate them along the following lines. Were the issues drawn clearly 
and sharply? Was each lawyer well-prepared? Did the contending 
parties' opposing versions of the facts emerge plainly before the jury? 
Were there puzzling gaps or distracting redundancies in the evi-
dence? Did either attorney appear to the judge or his adversary to be 
a victim of tactical surprise? Were unexpected witnesses called, or 
unanticipated documents produced? Was there the full mutual 
knowledge of the relevant evidence that was extolled as essential to 
proper litigation in the Hickman case? 
18. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
19. M. RosENBERG, supra note 13, at 31-32. 
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We also sent teams of observers to court to record independently 
their observations of the judges at work in the pretrial conferences. 
After analyzing the data from the more than 100,000 pages of records 
that resulted, we were able to report perceptible evidence that the 
cases subjected to mandatory pretrial conferences resulted in trials 
that registered higher scores judged by our indicators of quality. 
We did not put this finding as a firmly established fact-the data 
were not clear enough for that-but rather as a well-based hypoth-
esis that further research would be likely to confirm. 
Fairly appraised, the New Jersey experiment did not score an 
immediate major triumph, either methodologically or substantively. 
It did not produce a procedural Salk vaccine, did not isolate the 
virus of delay, or unlock the mystery of judicial ineffectiveness at 
pretrial. Its most dramatic finding was negative: New Jersey's man-
datory, universal pretrials did not step up judicial efficiency in 
negligence cases. All that effort seems an expensive way of finding 
out that the oyster has no pearl. But if you will take a longer view 
of procedural field studies of this kind, and if you will permit a 
change in the metaphor, you will see some doughnut around the hole. 
For one thing, these studies permit us to say with more assurance 
that pretrial and other highly touted court cures and nostrums simply 
do not improve efficiency. Finding this out is valuable because it 
cuts down traffic on the primrose path. That again may seem a per-
verse kind of progress until you consider what my colleague, Harry 
W. Jones, has pointed out: 
Physicists and biochemists often say that scientific knowledge gains 
fully as much from experiments that invalidate research hypotheses 
as from experiments that verify them. Perhaps the same is true of 
law's experiments in the control of social behavior.20 
Those who hope to improve court procedures by sustained 1:;fforts 
must face the prospect that many of their favorite hypotheses will be 
disproved by careful studies in the field. However, from the ashes of 
these seeming failures better hypotheses and more useful insights 
will undoubtedly arise. 
I leave to my colleagues to say whether the criteria of quality by 
which they would measure effectiveness in the English and Italian 
civil-justice systems have anything in common with those mentioned 
here. Obviously, to the extent that their systems' basic values diverge 
from ours, the aims of good process may also part company. But 
whether their indicia would be similar or different, the proposition 
20, H. JONES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW 13 (1968). 
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that to evaluate the quality of justice one must state the desired 
indicia of performance seems to me as applicable to cross-cultural 
procedural research as to the science or pseudo-science of intensive 
empirical research in the field. 
IV. PROMOTING QUALITY JUSTICE: THINKING NEW THOUGHTS 
The problem of promoting quality justice calls upon us for more 
imaginative responses than continuing to do the same things we have 
done for generations and merely adding deftness and efficiency. New 
thoughts are in order, some of which will be unthinkable, or at least 
unutterable, as I shall probably now demonstrate. 
The more charitable among you may regard the proposals that 
follow as "thinking aloud." Others will take them to be "more aloud 
than thinking"; and the rest will just shrug them off as a gabble of 
pipe dreams. Exposing you to these underdone ideas has two aims. 
One is to show that although it is not hard to find faults with our 
civil-justice system, it is very hard to find solutions. The other is to 
invite you to join me in a group grope toward some possible new 
approaches to our society's duty to deliver a civilized brand of civil 
justice. 
Like others today, the custodians of the administration 
of justice have a problem of priorities. They must reallocate to 
courts the disputes that courts are best suited for and that 
are, in a sense, best suited for them. They also face the problem 
of deciding whether the rewards and motivations now being 
offered to key actors in the judicial system are sensible and effective. 
Finally, they have problems of communication, both with regard to 
the citizenry and with regard to those who perform functions within 
the system. 
A. Reallocation of Disputes to Nonjudicial Disposition 
A comprehensive reinvestigation of the question which human 
disputes belong in the courts and which ones do not is long overdue. 
One reason for this undertaking is practical necessity. Our courts 
are simply and plainly being engulfed by a tidal wave of litigation, 
criminal and civil. The steep upward climb in the incidence of crime 
and the heavier per case demands resulting from newly defined pro-
cedural safeguards in criminal cases are major factors in this engulf-
ment. The engulfment, in turn, may result in a feedback that actually 
augments the rise in crime. Judge Carl McGowan, among others, 
has pointed ou~ 
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... I have never believed that the volume of crime is significantly 
responsive to what the courts do doctrinally, but I have come to 
think that crime rises as the time increases from initial arrest to 
final disposition; and delay is currently the greatest weakness in the 
administration of criminal justice.21 
This hypothesis holds deep significance for the administration of 
civil justice. It warns that along with fairness, impartiality, and open-
ness, celerity is a fourth dimension of quality criminal justice. 
For reasons of humaneness as well as efficacy, criminal prosecu-
tions must enjoy an absolute priority. As long as accused persons 
are penned up in jails and some are clamoring for the speedy trials 
that the Constitution guarantees them, we are unswervingly obli-
gated to take drastic measures. We must engineer a massive expan-
sion of our court systems; or arrange for the release of those detained 
too long without a trial; or else bring about the decriminalization 
of some categories of behavior now subject to penal law. 
What is perfectly clear is that we cannot and must not use our 
court facilities to deal with civil lawsuits if the consequence is to 
force persons criminally accused to languish behind bars awaiting 
trial. It is in this sense that criminal cases must be accorded absolute 
priority. An instance of this priority treatment has already occurred 
in New York City where last year the state courts ordered a tempo-
rary cessation of the trials of civil cases to permit the judges to devote 
their time and energy to criminal trials.22 We shall undoubtedly be 
seeing more of this necessary expedient if the crisis in criminal justice 
continues. 
Criminal cases have no place other than the courts to go so long 
as the offending conduct is defined as criminal. Of course, our 
definitions of criminal conduct could be changed. Various offenses 
against sumptuary, social, and sex behavior norms-drinking, drug-
ging, gambling, prostituting, and so forth-could go the way of 
minor offenses and simply exit from the courts. They could instead 
be heard, with appropriate procedural safeguards, by public officials 
other than judges in surroundings other than courtrooms. 
However, there is also a civil side to the problem of court suf-
focation. Our system has long encouraged going to court and this 
has been a healthy tradition. Now we have to face the fact that the 
past quarter of a century has seen a quantum leap in the use of the 
judicial process to remedy civil injustices. We clearly shall have to 
21. C. McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 99 
(1967). 
22. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 5. 
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put up unfamiliar barriers to discourage or restrict litigating if we 
are to avoid a complete breakdown in the justice system. 
The signs are multiplying that some classes of civil disputes 
will have to be excluded from the courts, entirely or in major 
proportions. Leading the candidates for exclusion are the high-
volume auto injury cases. Condemnation, probate, and ordinary 
divorce matters are other logical contenders for out-of-court treat-
ment. 
However, the problem of the courts goes beyond quantitative 
difficulties. Apart from coping with the volume, a compelling reason 
for looking closely at the nature of controversies the courts hear 
is to assure continued confi~ence in our judicial system. I refer here 
to qualitative problems that, in my opinion, have two dimensions. 
One is the danger of politicizing the courts; the other, of 
augmenting social instability through excessive use of the judicial 
process. United States Court of Appeals Judges Carl McGowan and 
Shirley M. Hufstedler23 have recently addressed this subject and have 
placed me greatly in their debt for some of the discussion that 
follows. 
Policy issues of high consequence and high tension have always 
come before American courts and always will. The growing menace 
today is the unrestrained tendency to take into the courts the most 
explosive issues in the society-and to present them with explosive 
forms of advocacy. There is a reason for this boom in resort to the 
judicial process. Courts have been, no doubt about it, the most re-
sponsive and the most effective agencies of change during the past 
generation. As a result, highly charged political and social issues, 
among many others, increasingly have been brought to the courts, 
not as a last resort, but as a first resort. The common attitude is that 
courts can do anything-and will-and that a rule one does not care 
for is not law unless a court says so-and the United States Supreme 
Court at that. 
For example, a short while ago the Columbia Spectator urged that 
recently announced tax-related guidelines for campus political activ-
ity "have no legal status" because the Internal Revenue Service's 
rulings and the "laws behind them can only be tested in court, and 
such a test has never been made."24 (Of course, this argument should 
not lead you to believe that if the courts happen to sustain the guide-
23. C. McGOWAN, supra note 21, at 75-82; Hufstedler, Dissent on Trial, 43 Omo BAR 
1086 (1970). 
24. Columbia Spectator, Oct. 1, 1970, at 2, col. 1. 
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lines, tranquil acceptance of them will erupt on Morning-side Heights; 
the Spectator was careful to add that "even if the courts were to 
uphold ... the guidelines, the laws backing them can be replaced, 
evaded or broken."25) 
The editorial bring-s to mind the waggish thumbnail "Restate-
ment of the Total Law" of three countries. In England, everything 
is permitted that is not expressly forbidden. In Russia, everything is 
forbidden that is not expressly permitted. And in France (and the 
Spectator's editorial office), it makes no difference whether something 
is permitted or forbidden; you do what you feel like. 
One of the consequences of overworking the idea that there 
is no law except as courts declare it is an erosion of confidence 
in other branches of government and, to a large extent, in the law-
making process of the society. Let me quote Judge McGowan again: 
... the seeming miracles being wrought in the courts on behalf of 
the disadvantaged are, in turn, stimulating new and ingenious as-
sertions of legal right and injury by those of a more exalted eco-
nomic status. Government at all levels finds its policies and actions 
increasingly challenged from every side by appeals for judicial inter-
vention. 
There are searching questions to be asked as to whether this 
development is wholly healthy, at least to the extent that it reflects 
cynicism about the responsiveness of legislative or executive policy 
to the political processes. It may be easier to file a lawsuit than to 
run for office, but it is not necessarily a better way to run the coun-
try. The judicial pendulum swings, and mine is a generation before 
whom our law professors incessantly paraded the then mischiefs of 
government by judiciary.20 
For Judge McGowan, there is reason to heed Justice Stone's admoni-
tion that "[c]ourts are not the only agency of government that must 
be assumed to have capacity to govern."27 
It would be bad enough if the sole result of all this resorting 
to the courts were to undermine confidence in the representative 
branches of government in favor of the judicial branch. But para-
doxically the courts themselves suffer an erosion in popular respect as 
they now begin to wield great powers in arenas they once declined to 
enter. Many judges of compassion and broad outlook recognize that 
if they sail into the eye of every social hurricane they will serve not 
only as lighthouses for the hopeful, but also as lightning rods for the 
frustrated. 
25. Id. 
26. C. McGowAN, supra note 21, at 104. 
27. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 87 (1936) O'ustice Stone, dissenting). 
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If irate losers cannot vent their disappointment in their votes for 
legislators, they will turn upon the judges and the courts whenever 
they get the chance. Thus, the judge who decided that cross-busing 
was constitutionally necessary to achieve racially balanced schools 
recently was turned out of office in Los Angeles when he stood for 
re-election.28 Think of what would happen at the polls in large 
sections of the country if the judges who decided close questions in 
church-state relations were forced to stand for election. As questions 
that judges once defined as political are increasingly redefined by 
them as judicial, the popular reaction will be to redefine the judge's 
role as political, with unhappy consequences. 
Perhaps the social forces at large in this country today have made 
inevitable the weakening of doctrines that Judge Hufstedler has 
referred to as the "litigation avoiders and stoppers."29 Among these , 
are the concepts of justiciability, standing, immunity, and abstention. 
These doctrines no longer inhibit the courts from proceeding to 
decision with the braking power they once exerted. The result has 
been the greater politicization of the judicial process and an 
"increase by several atmospheres of the pressure on the courts,"30 with 
greater pressures still to come. Wrongly or rightly, the voters regard 
the courts with less confidence if they think that the courts are mak-
ing political decisions they ought not to be making. 
Erosion of confidence is proceeding for still another reason: the 
tendency toward constitutional overkill. Many lawyers regard every 
case as a challenge to their ability to concoct a constitutional issue, 
however far they must reach for it. It is not, in my opinion, a good 
thing to tell the people of the country that the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court will set right every dissatisfaction they have with the 
way things are going. I am afraid that constant stretching and pulling 
at the words of the Constitution to bring about good changes has 
given some people the idea that contracting and pushing at its words 
is a good way to bring about bad changes. 
A group of upright and outraged citizens in Boston has lately 
begun a suit to restrain CBS from showing the television program 
Wild, Wild West because of its asserted overuse of violence and 
horror. My personal sympathies are with the citizens. Does the 
Constitution have anything more than the free speech principle to 
help settle the dispute? According to press quotes of the plaintiffs' 
filed papers, they want to close down the Wild, Wild West by getting 
28. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1970, at I, col. 5. 
29. Hufstedler, supra note 23, at 1088. 
30. Id. at 1088. 
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a judgment declaring that " 'child viewers of television programs 
containing violence and horror are being deprived of their constitu-
tional right to be free from mental harm caused by such programs 
without due process of law.' "31 Does that stretch the constitutional 
argument a bit thin? Never mind. What's the Constitution for, if you 
can't use it when you have a cause you care about deeply? 
Try to explain that the use of constitutional categories may im-
pose excessive rigidity in dealing with many issues that require 
flexibility. Try to point out that the Constitution cannot be used 
promiscuously without paying the usual penalty for promiscuity in 
loss of reputation. I have nothing to recommend about the constitu-
tional-overkill tendency beyond noting the danger. It merely under-
lines the point that we lawyers have been too intent on using the 
adversary litigation model as the universal process for resolving dis-
putes. This is explainable as advocates' conceit, but it has led us 
to neglect other and better alternatives. 
One alternative to taking every controversy imaginable to court 
is to submit selected classes of civil controversies to tribunals other 
than courts. Arbitration of labor disputes and commercial disputes 
on an agreed and voluntary basis is an obvious model. Compulsory 
arbitration of sued claims of 3,000 dollars or less has recently been 
introduced in New York32 after many years of tryout in Pennsyl-
vania.33 Both states give litigants the option of returning to the 
courts if dissatisfied with the arbitration, but that option could be 
annulled by appropriate measures. This process may find more 
widespread acceptance; yet in long-range terms, it is not very satis-
fying to substitute one adversarial model for another. 
A more hopeful approach would be to de-escalate the combative 
character of large volumes of conflict-prone occurrences by providing 
for "compensation without litigation." Examples would include the 
statutes that authorize administrative boards to indemnify victims of 
violent crimes;34 and the slowly spreading programs of "no-fault" 
automobile injury reparation.35 And much more drastic departures 
from the adversary model are conceivable. For example, why not 
create a Department of Economic Justice to dispense quickly reme-
dies in cash or in kind to complaining customers who have been 
31. N.Y. Times, Nov. I!l, 1970, at 75, col. 1. 
32. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1970). 
33. PA. STAT. tit. 5, § 30 (1963). 
34. E.g., CAL. WELF. &: INSTNs. CODE § 11211 (West 1966); N.Y. Ex.Ee. LAW §§ 620-
35 (McKinney Supp. 1970). 
35. E.g., MAss • .ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1970). 
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unable to get satisfaction from the merchant or manufacturer respon-
sible for the defective product? 
Today, in our bondage to the adversary litigation process, we 
operate with costly clumsiness. When a person is on welfare and his 
seventy-five-dollar television tube has prematurely failed and we 
want to express our concern for his rights and assure him that they 
will be vindicated, we proceed from rigid habit. We refer him to a 
lawyer in a neighborhood office who invests many hours of work in 
investigating, telephoning, corresponding, and, perhaps, litigating 
against an adversary whose lawyers do likewise, and, being 
much better paid, doubtless invest even more adversarial energy. 
The lawyers and litigants sometimes wind up in court where 
they then consume judicial energies bought with public money. In 
the end, it must often happen that the claim and litigation costs far, 
far exceed the amount in dispute. 
Why not try a totally different model? On a pilot project basis, I 
propose that in a number of cities public funds or private financing 
be obtained to undenvrite experimentally a system of delivering jus-
tice that would not start with combat and high friction costs. Its 
main features would be simple. When the customer presents his 
grievance, his statement will be taken down, he will sign his name, 
and on the spot will be given the relief due him, up to a limit of, 
say, 200 dollars or so, in cash or in kind. 
From the public viewpoint, the system could have advantages not 
only of economy but also of effectiveness. Through a national net-
work of offices, the Department of Economic Justice would learn 
quickly if a manufacturer has been making defective television tubes 
or components on a grand scale; or thousands of unsafe brake linings; 
or too many permeable raincoats. Then it would be able to take the 
legal action appropriate to the situation-including wholesale (and 
hence, economically worthwhile) suits to recover amounts it had 
already paid out administratively, along with costs, interest, and 
other economic sanctions; or cease and desist orders; or sterner sanc-
tions if appropriate. This system would offer an efficient way of 
coordinating complaints and consolidating claims that have a com-
mon basis. It would also permit quality control of a more effective 
kind than isolated court suits do. 
Similar procedures could also be applied against major merchan-
dising enterprises, such as mail-order houses, national chain stores, 
or large department stores. Wholesale bad practices could be 
more readily exposed and eliminated, instead of, as is now true, being 
lost to sight through diffusion. 
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The consumer will realize these benefits: an instant remedy in-
stead of the long drawn-out litigation process we now offer; clear 
proof that society is concerned that he be dealt with fairly, which is 
the fundamental message we want to convey; and the feeling that 
society trusts him, since it takes his word that his claim is valid. 
Some will say that the plan is naive and that consumers will cheat 
on a massive scale by presenting dishonest claims. An antidote might 
be to use the type of spot checks that income tax collection services 
use-apparently with good results. The complaining consumer will 
be told: "We trust you and will pay you, or repair or replace your 
defective product. To guard against cheating by those who might 
put in false claims, we will run random spot checks on applicants, 
investigating some claims intensively. If the follow-up uncovers fraud, 
we will deal with the culprit accordingly." 
An experimental program could be set up and tried out in a 
half-dozen cities with a ceiling for each claim of, for instance, 100, 
200, or 250 dollars, and with a floor of twenty-five dollars. If the plan 
worked well or could be modified to work well, it could be extended 
to nonconsumer cases and to nonwelfare customers. As a matter of 
fact, the experiment itself could make room for testing those types 
and other types of cases in which economic justice could be delivered 
sans litigation, sans lawyers, sans courts, sans everything-except a 
prompt remedy and effective enforcement. If successful, the program 
would warrant public funding out of appropriately gathered 
revenues. 
A principle of the type underlying the Department of Economic 
Justice proposal was put forward in a different way recently by Judge 
Macklin Fleming of California. He argued for what he termed 
"routinization" of the handling of stereotyped disputes as a defense 
for the litigation explosion: 
Courts, executives, and legislatures can pool their efforts to en-
courage the development of institutions and techniques capable of 
handling routine business in an inexpensive and expeditious way 
outside the arena of adversary litigation.36 
Judge Fleming had in mind divorce and decedents' estates matters, 
both of which seem well-suited to other than lawsuit disposition 
unless special circumstances arise. Other classes of conflict-prone 
matters that should be shunted from the courts can readily be con-
ceived. 
l!6. Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109, 111 
(1970). 
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Of course, neither the hypothesized Department of Economic Jus-
tice, nor administrative agencies, nor arbitration boards, nor any 
other official substitute for court-made dispositions, will be trouble-
free. Still, the effort to de-adversarialize and de-judicialize matters 
that do not absolutely require the full panoply of court processes 
must be made, problems or no. 
The sum of all these proposals can be put bluntly. We lawyers 
must rid ourselves of the habit of mind that holds that in conflict 
management, happiness is a thing called "certiorari granted" or 
"probable jurisdiction noted." We have to reconcile ourselves-
indeed, we have to dedicate ourselves-to the proposition that courts 
cannot do everything to correct society's flaws. We have to withdraw 
from the judicial process some of the disputes that now threaten the 
administration of justice-quantitatively, qualitatively, and explo-
sively. 
B. Changing Rewards and Motivations 
The problem of court delay has resisted man's valiant attempts 
to conquer it as far back as one would care to look. It does not 
appear to be as complicated a problem as many that human ingenuity 
has solved over the ages. There must be more to the delay problem 
than pathological obstinacy of a logical kind. What can it be? 
One hypothesis is that we have built into the system incidental 
and unintended rewards and motivations that induce the main 
actors, who could stamp out most delay if they so desired, to decline 
to do so. They are not necessarily acting irresponsibly or unprofes-
sionally in withholding their cooperation. It has been pointed out 
that "[p ]art of the difficulty in getting rid of court congestion appears 
to be ... [that] it is not simply an accidental defect of the law, but is 
rooted in some of the legal system's most cherished characteristics."37 
Whether sought after or unbidden, wayward incentives manage to 
find their way into the court processes and induce actions directly 
opposed to the goals and objectives the system is designed to achieve. 
Unforeseen self-interest is often the operative determinant. A piquant 
example of this type of incentive emerged from the New Jersey pre-
trial conference experiment. In cases not scheduled for mandatory 
pretrial, either lawyer was allowed to opt for a conference. Aside from 
impairing the scientific purity of the experiment, this option devel-
oped an odd little datum-if you recall that a side effect of manda-
tory pretrial is to increase the plaintiffs' recoveries by substantial 
37. Sykes, Cases, Courts and Congestion, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SoCIErY !127, !128 
(L. Nader ed. 1969). 
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amounts. In the first few hundred cases in which the option was 
exercised by only one side, it was the defendants' attorneys who opted 
seven times out of ten. We puzzled over why this should be, because 
we could not see any particular advantage to defendants (insurance 
companies) in having a pretrial conference in most cases. Then our 
attention was drawn to an item in the New Jersey Bar Journal pre-
senting the script of a fictitious one-act play. Its plot showed that an 
eminent law firm, seemingly representing liability insurers, liked 
pretrial conferences because it was paid on a piece-work basis for 
each one attended and the price was rightl 38 
A careful study of the system of judicial administration in each 
of the states will reveal, I am confident, hidden incentives that 
induce actions directly opposed to improved judicial effectiveness. 
To find the hidden motivators will take skill, patience, and imagina-
tion. But the task is well worth the effort. If we once come to under-
stand why la'wyers at times act perversely and contrary to the best 
interests of the administration of justice, we can try to revise the 
incentives and rewards so they will help advance, rather than oppose, 
the judicial system's aspirations. 
C. Improving Communications 
Changing incentives will not be enough, however, unless we 
find effective ways to communicate the law's messages to its-for want 
of a better word--customers. Communications science has been one 
of the most neglected of society's resources in past efforts to improve 
the administration of justice. 
An example of this communications gap came to my attention in 
the mid-1950's. In New York it had been noticed that about sixteen 
per cent of all suits brought against persons covered by automobile 
liability insurance were started without any advance claim, phone 
call, letter, or warning. The plaintiff's lawyer simply served a 
summons upon the insured, who forwarded the summons to his in-
surance company, which thus learned that a claim was pending 
against its insured. Investigation disclosed that the plaintiff's bar 
followed the "summons-first-notice" practice because by thus starting 
suit the lawyer was protected against his claimant's change of heart 
or change of lawyer. The filing of the suit gave the plaintiff's lawyer a 
statutory lien on any recovery thereafter realized by the plaintiff, 
even though he defected to another lawyer. 
38. A Pretrial Conference, 3 N.J. ST. B.J. 363 (1960). 
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To remedy this situation and to avoid promiscuous suing by the 
plaintiff's bar, motivated in the way just described, the legis-
lature amended the statute to provide that a lien would exist in 
favor of the plaintiff's lawyer even if he did not start suit but merely 
·wrote a claim letter. Records over the next few years showed that 
the percentage of "summons-first-notice" suits started did not decline 
to any appreciable extent. In 1959, at a meeting of the Plaintiffs 
Trial Lawyers Association, I distributed questionnaires to a chamber 
full of Association members, reported the statistics, and asked why 
they continued using the "summons-first-notice" practice in view of 
the statutory change that had been made in order to safeguard their 
retainer liens by writing instead of suing. To my question the over-
whelming response was, "What change in what law?" 
The message had not gotten through. The change in motivation 
had, therefore, not taken effect. The evil sought to be avoided accord-
ingly persisted. 
The point is that "good" procedures cannot work effectively, and 
cannot, therefore, be good unless they are communicated to those 
who are supposed to be made aware of them. In this country perhaps 
our most notorious communications failure involves the jury, both 
in criminal and in civil cases. We rhapsodize about the jurors as the 
shields of our liberty, yet we treat them like imbeciles while the evi-
dence goes in and then like jurisprudential sponges who can soak 
up years of law from a single droning lecture at the end of trial. 
When that moment of truth arrives, the jurors "are instructed in the 
law . . . in language they are not likely to understand because it 
is usually copied from appellate court opinions and directed not so 
much at the jurors as at the judges who may later review the case on 
appeal."39 
Oddly enough, jurors themselves often let us know that there 
are particular instructions that give them more trouble than others-
those about which they send back messages asking the judge for 
further clarification-but we usually pay no attention. Has anyone in 
this state kept track of the requests for re-instruction by Michigan 
juries as clues for determining which are the most incomprehensible 
charges the judge delivers? To do so would be a useful task for the 
law review editors or free-lance researchers. 
Of course, even better than getting rid of the static in communi-
cations to the jury would be getting rid of the jury itself in most 
39. D. KARLEN, JUDICIAL .ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN ExPERIENCE 35 (1970). 
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civil cases, as the English have done. The jury system may" be, as Sir 
John Barry remarked, "a good nursery for the bar,"io but one would 
think that in these times there are more productive educational toys 
for young advocates to play with. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The pluralistic American system of civil justice remains the 
wonder of the world of judicial administration. It is riddled with 
archaic rigidities and indefensible paradoxes. It is often sluggish and 
irrational. As an instrument for resolving disputes, its greatest re-
deeming feature is that it stands alongside our system of criminal 
justice, where its warts seem beauty marks by contrast. It will im-
prove; it must. 
Removing from courts matters that can be disposed of in other 
ways, devising productive motivations and incentives, and imple-
menting improved communications are approaches that may help 
improve the quality of justice. In addition, we need improvement in 
three vital areas: men, machinery, and management. 
Men-the judges, their aides, and other human resources-are 
at the top of the list of needed improvements. The judges must be 
properly selected, qualified, and trained. They must be upright-· 
they must deserve to be called "Honorable." In populous states and 
crowded cities it is impossible for the chief judges to administrate 
by day and adjudicate by night, or vice versa. There should be a 
division of labor to permit a judge for a period of time to serve ex-
clusively as an administrator; later he would return to adjudicating. 
Machinery-the physical resources of courts-must be provided 
in civilized abundance. My guess is that we spend less on our courts 
than on peanut butter. The balance should be struck so that we have 
not only the bricks and mortar, but also the equipment-well-
designed courtrooms and space-work layouts-and the essential in-
struments for storing and retrieving information about workload and 
performance. 
Management-by professionally trained career personnel-is not 
a fancy frill, but a necessity. A recent survey of five federal district 
courts, which was commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center, 
reported that even after exemplary new methods are developed in 
judicial administration in federal courts, "there is not an effective 
... management system for implementing [the] known good prac-
40. Barry, Compensation Without Litigation, 37 Ausn.. L.J. 339, 343 (1964). 
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tices."41 This gap is presently being filled. The means of updating 
court methods, techniques, and administration are being studied and 
taught by a group of profession-minded organizations that includes, 
in addition to the Federal Judicial Center, the American Judicature 
Society, the National College of State Trial Judges, the Institute of 
Judicial Administration, and the new Institute for Court Manage-
ment. 
The courts must not be required to do more than courts can do, 
quantitatively or qualitatively. Avoiding overuse requires deter-
mining what types of controversies shall be retained in the court 
system, and then devising for them sensible, efficient, fair rules of 
procedure that can be studied and tested in action. Not all cases 
deserve the same type of court attention and not all procedures 
should apply across the board to all types of cases. 
With the proper mix of cases, men, mechanisms, modernization 
capacity, and management, we can turn more intelligently to the 
Task Force's proposed major effort. We can improve the quality of 
justice for individuals by establishing a system that will be more 
humane, compassionate, and civilized than today's because it will 
be fitted with the men and means to function as it should-and not 
be abused by profligate overuse. 
41. NORTH AM. ROCKWELL INFORMATION SYSTEMS Co., SUMMARY OF A MANAGEMENT 
AND SYSTEMS SURVEY OF THE U.S. COURTS 3 (1969). 
